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BUT WE DIDN’T AGREE TO THAT!: WHY CLASS 
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE IMPLIED FROM 
SILENT OR AMBIGUOUS ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
AFTER LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA 
Andrea DeMelo Laprade+ 
Arbitration clauses are everywhere.  Almost everyone at some point has 
agreed to individual arbitration in a consumer or employment contract.1  The 
usage of arbitration clauses is aided by the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
enforce the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),2 which provides that 
arbitration agreements are enforceable by the courts.3  But what happens when 
consumers have a problem and want to proceed with arbitration as a class rather 
than as individuals?  Then, what if the arbitration clause in the contract 
ostensibly does not say anything about class proceedings?  The Supreme Court 
held that bilateral arbitration is the default mode of arbitration “envisioned by 
the FAA.”4  Arbitration is “a matter of contract.”5  The FAA “places arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, . . . and requires courts to 
enforce them according to their terms.”6  As a result, the Court’s decisions 
support the use of arbitration agreements to arbitrate on an individual basis and 
 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (2021); M.A., Liberty 
University (2013); B.A., College of the Holy Cross (2010).  The author would like to thank God 
for His divine mercy; her husband, Craig, for his unwavering support and patience; her parents, 
Serie and João, for their love and the gift of education; and Professor Antonio Fidel Perez for 
providing her mind with a mental workout during every feedback session.  She would also like to 
give thanks to the editors and staff members of the Catholic University Law Review for their stellar 
work during a difficult year and for assisting in the editing of this Note. 
 1. E.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; see also Richard Frankel, The 
Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 550 (2014) (demonstrating how 
arbitration clauses are used in many contexts and are “inserted in millions of contracts and are 
pervasive in many spheres, including banking, credit cards, home building, investment advising, 
cell phones, and auto dealers”). 
 2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307. 
 3. Id. § 2. 
 4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).  The Supreme Court also 
asserts that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA.”  Id. 
at 349. 
 5. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 6. Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
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not in a collective proceeding unless the agreement specifically states 
otherwise.7 
The purpose of this Note is to address how the Lamps Plus v. Varela decision 
created more confusion about the question of class arbitrability and to argue that 
the failure to address the particulars of the availability of class arbitration will 
perpetuate litigation on this issue.  This Note suggests that the FAA’s purpose 
supports the Court’s current presumption against class arbitration if the parties 
do not agree to it during the contracting process and that the use of contra 
proferentem to create class arbitration is, therefore, contrary to the FAA’s 
purpose. 
Section I provides a brief overview of the FAA, Lamps Plus, and its 
preemption holding.  Section II walksthrough the existing case law regarding 
class arbitration.  Section III analyzes the usage of contra proferentem as 
procedural and substantive law to achieve class arbitration and the preemption 
of state law by federal law.  Section IV demonstrates why courts should not 
imply class proceedings when an arbitration clause is silent or ambiguous.  
Finally, Section V concludes by making a case for the Supreme Court to clarify 
its stance on class arbitration and the FAA’s preemptive effects so as to end 
confusion for practitioners and judges alike. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES ON CLASS ARBITRATION ONCE AGAIN: 
LAMPS PLUS V. VARELA, CONTRA PROFERENTEM, AND PREEMPTION 
On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided in Lamps Plus that shifting 
from individual to class arbitration “fundamentally changes the nature of the 
‘traditional individualized arbitration’ envisioned by the FAA” when an 
arbitration clause is silent and is therefore ambiguous as to class arbitration.8  
Furthermore, the Court held that “an ambiguous agreement can[not] provide the 
necessary ‘contractual basis’ for compelling class arbitration” and that the FAA 
“requires more than ambiguity to ensure that the parties actually agreed to 
arbitrate on a classwide basis.”9 
In Lamps Plus, the Supreme Court considered the interaction between the 
FAA and California contract law, where “an agreement is ambiguous ‘when it 
is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’”10  The 
Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision “based on California’s rule 
that ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter, a doctrine 
 
 7. See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 
351 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). 
 8. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 
(2018) 
 9. Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 
(2009). 
 10. Id. at 1415–16 (quoting Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 
2017)). 
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known as contra proferentem.”11  The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning because contra proferentem does not resolve the ambiguity of the 
party’s intent, but instead the ambiguity is resolved “based on public policy 
factors, primarily equitable considerations about the parties’ relative bargaining 
strength” by asking who drafted the agreement.12  This analysis does not provide 
a window into the parties’ consent; thus, the Court found that FAA preempted 
the state law, creating a scheme “inconsistent with the FAA.”13 
The arbitration community was puzzled as to why the Supreme Court wanted 
to review Lamps Plus because the Court had previously ruled on similar 
circumstances in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.14  The Lamps 
Plus majority stated that Stolt-Nielsen’s reasoning controlled the decision.15  In 
Stolt-Nielsen, the Court ruled that when an arbitration agreement is “silent,” the 
question of class arbitration must be based on the arbitrator’s construing of the 
clause after “identify[ing] the rule of law that governs in that situation.”16  
Arbitrators are not to make public policy as “the task of an arbitrator is to 
interpret and enforce a contract.”17 
 
 11. Id. at 1417.  The Court further reasoned that contra proferentem applies “only as a last 
resort” when a contract “remains ambiguous after exhausting the ordinary methods of 
interpretation.”  Id.; see also 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021) (“The ‘contra proferentem’ 
device is intended to aid a party whose bargaining power was less than that of the draftsperson.”). 
 12. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (“[T]he FAA provides the default rule for resolving 
ambiguity.”). 
 13. Id. at 1418.  The Court relied on precedent, stating “that courts may not rely on state 
contract principles to ‘reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide 
arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.’”  Id. (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. 
Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)). 
 14. See Henry Allen Blair, Breaking News: SCOTUS Surprises Absolutely No One in Lamps 
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, ARBITRATION NATION (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.arbitrationnation.com/
breaking-news-scotus-surprises-absolutely-no-one-in-lamps-plus-inc-v-varela/.  Mr. Blair points 
out: 
It’s not at all evident to me why SCOTUS felt the need to grant review of Lamps Plus, 
Inc. v. Varela.  But it did.  And the majority decision, authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts, did precisely what I think that everyone at the case expected: it held that the 
courts cannot find the necessary consent to class arbitration in an ambiguous arbitration 
clause. 
Id.; see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 15. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 16. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673.  But see Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 
452 (2003) (“In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not 
arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter . . . includ[ing] certain gateway matters, 
such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement.”). 
 17. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672.  When this happens, the Court reasoned that it “must 
conclude that what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy 
regarding class arbitration.”  Id. 
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II.  A WALK THROUGH THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND AMBIGUOUS 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES: THE COURT EXPANDS AND THEN LIMITS CLASS 
ARBITRATION 
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enforce arbitration agreements after 
observing “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”18  The FAA 
states that “[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction . . . to 
settle by arbitration, a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”19  The following 
clause is colloquially known as the savings clause, which states that arbitration 
agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”20  Since its enactment, the Supreme Court 
has demonstrated a policy favoring arbitration.21  Since the 1980s, the Court has 
characterized the FAA as a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.”22  Despite this pro-arbitration viewpoint, the Court has imposed 
limitations on how arbitration should proceed, particularly when arbitration 
clauses are silent or ambiguous.23 
A.  AT&T Technologies: Arbitrating Arbitrability 
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, a union 
sought to compel arbitration in a labor dispute regarding a grievance under the 
terms of their collective bargaining agreement against an employer pursuant to 
the Labor Management Relations Act.24  The Communications Workers of 
America filed a grievance against AT&T when they laid off seventy-nine 
workers in Chicago, claiming that it would violate their agreement.25  The 
relevant arbitration clause was found in Article 8 of their agreement and stated 
that “‘differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the 
performance of any obligation hereunder’ must be referred to a mutually 
agreeable arbitrator upon the written demand of either party.”26 
 
 18. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 19. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 20. Id. 
 21. E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).  The Court states 
here that the “FAA’s pro[-]arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the 
contracting parties.”  Id.; see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“The 
FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”). 
 22. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also 
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019) (interpreting the FAA to require arbitration 
clause interpretation to favor arbitration). 
 23. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[A] 
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual 
basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”). 
 24. AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 644–46 (1986). 
 25. Id. at 645–46. 
 26. Id. at 644–45.  The Court highlights other relevant provisions in the bargaining agreement: 
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AT&T did not submit the grievance to arbitration because “the Company’s 
decision to lay off workers when it determine[d] that a lack of work exists in a 
facility [wa]s not arbitrable.”27  The union subsequently filed suit in federal court 
to compel arbitration and the district court, ruling on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, found “that the ‘union’s interpretation . . . was at least “arguable,”’ . 
. . [and] that it was ‘for the arbitrator, not the court to decide whether the union’s 
interpretation has merit.’”28  The district court ordered AT&T to arbitrate.29  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court.30  AT&T appealed to the 
Supreme Court to answer “whether a collective-bargaining agreement create[d] 
a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance,” and the Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals’ decision.31 
Justice White wrote for a unanimous court and held that the Seventh Circuit 
was incorrect to order the parties to arbitrate the arbitrability question because 
that question was “undeniably an issue for judicial determination.”32  It noted 
that “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, 
not the arbitrator.”33  The Court later reasoned: 
It is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine 
whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs 
predicated on a “lack of work” determination by the Company.  If the 
court determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the 
arbitrator to determine the relative merits of the parties’ substantive 
interpretations of the agreement.  It was for the court, not the arbitrator, 
to decide in the first instance whether the dispute was to be resolved 
through arbitration.34 
 
Article 9 provides that, “subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this 
contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause,” AT&T 
is free to exercise certain management functions, including the hiring and placement 
of employees and the termination of employment.  “When lack of work necessitates 
Layoff,” Article 20 prescribes the order in which employees are to be laid off. 
Id. at 645 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. Id. at 646. 
 28. Id. at 647. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; see Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).  Here, the Court 
notes that the Seventh Circuit “acknowledged the ‘general rule’ that the issue of arbitrability is for 
the courts to decide unless the parties stipulate otherwise, but noted that this Court’s decisions . . . 
caution courts to avoid becoming entangled in the merits of a labor dispute under the guise of 
deciding arbitrability.”  Id. at 647 (first citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960); and then citing Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)). 
 31. Id. at 648–49. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 649. 
 34. Id. at 651. 
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The Court further explained that “where the contract contains an arbitration 
clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability . . . ‘unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an 
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute . . . . [But d]oubts should be 
resolved in favor of coverage.’”35 
Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence to “supplement what has been said in 
order to avoid any misunderstandings on remand and in future cases.”36  He 
reasoned that “[t]he Seventh Circuit misunderstood these rules of contract 
construction” and performed its analysis contrary to precedent because 
“determining arbitrability does not require the court even to consider which 
party is correct with respect to the meaning of [an arbitration clause].”37  
Although Justice Brennan attempted to clarify any misunderstandings on 
remand and for future cases, the misunderstandings and confusion remain today. 
B.  First Options: No Clear Agreement About Arbitrability Means That the 
Court May Review the Dispute 
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, a couple was required to pay the 
entire debt of their wholly-owned investment company and their stock trading 
clearinghouse after the October 1987 stock market crash.38  The Kaplans, their 
company, MKI, and the clearinghouse, First Options, entered into a “workout” 
agreement to pay the debts owed to First Options due to the crash.39  First 
Options demanded the MKI debt, insisted that the Kaplans pay any deficiency, 
and when that did not work, First Options went to arbitration.40  The workout 
plan consisted of four documents, only one of which contained an arbitration 
clause.41  MKI signed that document, but the Kaplans did not.42  Since MKI 
signed the document containing the arbitration clause, MKI accepted 
arbitration.43  However, the Kaplans denied that their disagreement was 
arbitrable and filed written objections to the arbitration panel.44  Ultimately, the 
arbitration panel decided that they had the power to arbitrate and ruled in First 
Options’ favor.45 
 
 35. Id. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83). 
 36. Id. at 652. 
 37. Id. at 654–55.  Justice Brennan further explaind in his concurrence that “because the 
parties have submitted to us only fragmentary pieces of the bargaining history, we are not in a 
position properly to evaluate whether there is ‘the most forceful evidence’ that the parties did not 
intend for this dispute to be arbitrable.”  Id. at 655–56. 
 38. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995). 
 39. Id. at 941. 
 40. Id. at 940. 
 41. Id. at 941. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  The arbitration panel concluded that “they had the power to rule on the merits of the 
parties’ dispute.”  Id. 
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Both parties petitioned the federal district court; the Kaplans asked the court 
to vacate the arbitration award, whereas First Options requested confirmation.46  
The District Court confirmed First Options’ award, but the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed the District Court.47  The Third Circuit agreed with the 
Kaplans that their dispute was, in fact, not arbitrable.48  First Options then 
appealed to the Supreme Court to review the arbitrability determination.49 
Here, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “the law treats silence or 
ambiguity about the question ‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’ 
differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question 
‘whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the 
scope of a valid arbitration agreement.’”50  The Court reasoned that because 
there was not a clear agreement between the Kaplans and First Options, it 
affirmed the Third Circuit “in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First 
Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts.”51 
C.  Bazzle: Is Class Arbitration Forbidden or Is the Contract Silent? 
When a couple asked a South Carolina court to certify their claim as a class 
action against a loan provider in Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, 
they objected to the loan company’s failure to provide them with a required 
form.52  This form would have allowed them to name their own lawyers and 
insurance agents during their loan transactions.53  The arbitration clause 
included in the contract between the Bazzles and Green Tree Financial 
Corporation stated the following: 
ARBITRATION—All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from 
or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this 
contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator 
selected by us with consent of you.  This arbitration contract is made 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 944–45 (emphasis in original); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24) (“[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute to is 
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute . . . . [B]y applying the ‘federal 
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the 
Act.’”). 
 51. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947.  The Court refuted First Options’ argument that the FAA 
“requires a presumption that the Kaplans agreed to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision, not the 
contrary.”  Id. at 946.  The Court reasoned that “the basic objective in this area is not to resolve 
disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, . . . but to ensure that 
commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, ‘are enforced’ . . . according to the 
intentions of the parties.”  Id. at 947 (citations omitted). 
 52. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447–48 (2003). 
 53. Id. at 448. 
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pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1 [9 U.S.C.S. § 1] . 
. . .  THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE 
ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER 
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR 
PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION BY US (AS PROVIDED 
HEREIN) . . . .  The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator 
shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract.  These 
powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but 
not limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive 
relief.54 
The South Carolina trial court certified a class action and entered an order 
compelling arbitration.55 The arbitrator administered the subsequent 
proceedings as a class arbitration and awarded the class with statutory damages 
and attorney’s fees.56  The trial court confirmed this award and was then 
appealed.57  Green Tree’s argument was that class arbitration was “legally 
impermissible,” but the South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew the case from 
the Court of Appeals and subsequently held that “the contracts were silent in 
respect to class arbitration, . . . authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration 
had properly taken that form.”58 
In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court considered if the South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was consistent with the FAA.59  The Court 
reasoned that contrary to the South Carolina Trial Court’s decision, it did not 
think that the contract’s language clearly authorized class arbitration.60  The 
Court explained that it could not “automatically accept the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s resolution of this contract-interpretation question” and that it 
was for the arbitrator to resolve, not a court.61 
After performing an analysis of the contract and the parties’ agreement, the 
Court concluded that because the arbitration contract issue was a dispute 
“‘relating to this contract’ and the resulting ‘relationships,’” then the parties 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 449. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 450. 
 58. Id. at 449–50. The Court observed the difference between an individual and bilateral 
arbitration, noting that “class arbitration involves an arbitration, not simply between Green Tree 
and a named customer, but also between Green Tree and other (represented) customers, all taking 
place before the arbitrator chosen to arbitrate the initial, named customer’s dispute.”  Id. at 450–
51. 
 59. Id. at 450. 
 60. Id. at 453–54. 
 61. Id. at 451.  The Court initially asked whether “the contracts [were] in fact silent, or . . . 
[if] they forb[ade] class arbitration,” and reasoned that although it was “important to resolve that 
question . . .  [it could not] do so, not simply because it is a matter of state law, but also because it 
is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.”  Id. at 447. 
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ostensibly had “agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the relevant 
question.”62  The majority distinguished the case from First Options, stating that 
“[u]nlike First Options, the question is not whether the parties wanted a judge 
or an arbitrator to decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter . . . . Rather 
the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties 
agreed to.”63  The Court further highlighted the broad language in the contract 
at issue which dictated that “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from 
or relating to this contract or the relationships which result[ed] from [it],” and 
concluded that the issue was not a question of arbitrability, but an issue 
concerning contract interpretation and arbitration procedures.64 
While the majority in Bazzle was clear that the issue was for the arbitrator to 
decide, the dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy, maintained that the question was for the courts, not the 
arbitrator, to determine if the arbitration as agreed to could proceed as a class 
arbitration.65  This dissent also contends that “the holding of the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina contravenes the terms of the contract and is therefore pre-
empted by the FAA.”66  In the second dissent, written by Justice Thomas, he 
noted that the FAA “does not apply to proceedings in state courts” and therefore 
“cannot be a ground for pre-empting a state court’s interpretation of a private 
arbitration agreement.”67  Justice Thomas would express his disagreement with 
the Court’s application of preemption law in subsequent cases.68 
D.  Stolt-Nielsen: A Contractual Basis is Required to Compel Class 
Arbitration under the FAA 
In the Supreme Court’s decision preceding Lamps Plus, Stolt-Nielsen, the 
petitioners were shipping companies that disputed “a standard contract known 
in the maritime world as a ‘charter party,’” with one of their customers, 
AnimalFeeds.69  The charter party used by AnimalFeeds is known as the 
“Vegilvoy” and contained the following arbitration clause: 
 
 62. Id. at 451–52.  Furthermore, the Court here distinguished Bazzle from First Options, 
reasoning that “[t]he question here . . . concern[ed] neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor 
its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties.”  Id. at 452. 
 63. Id. (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. at 456 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 455–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 68. see, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (stating that he has become “increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond 
their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption.”); Pharmaceutical Rsch. and Mfrs. Of Am. 
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 678 (2003) (Thomas, J. concurring) (explaining that there is a “concomitant 
danger of invoking obstacle pre-emption based on the arbitrary selection of one purpose to the 
exclusion of others.”). 
 69. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2010). 
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Arbitration.  Any dispute arising from the making, performance or 
termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner 
and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, 
broker or individual experienced in the shipping business; the two thus 
chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall 
be an Admiralty lawyer.  Such arbitration shall be conducted in 
conformity with the provisions and procedure of the United States 
Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a judgment of the Court shall be 
entered upon any award made by said arbitrator.70 
In 2003, Stolt-Nielsen was found in a Department of Justice criminal 
investigation to have engaged in an “illegal price-fixing conspiracy.”71  
AnimalFeeds, on behalf of a class of similarly-situated plaintiffs, filed suit in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “asserting antitrust 
claims for supracompetitive prices” that Stolt-Nielsen had allegedly charged 
their customers.72  Other charterers brought suits in other federal courts, and in 
the District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court held that the claims 
were not subject to arbitration, but the Second Circuit subsequently reversed.73  
Soon after, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all of the 
actions against Stolt-Nielsen, which included the AnimalFeeds suit.74  It was 
undisputed between the parties that after the federal court judgments and orders, 
AnimalFeeds and the other charterers “must arbitrate their antitrust dispute.”75 
In 2005, Stolt-Nielsen was served a demand for class arbitration by 
AnimalFeeds.76  Then “[t]he parties entered into a supplemental agreement,” 
which agreed to submit the question of  class arbitration “to a panel of  three  
arbitrators.”77  Both Stolt-Nielsen and AnimalFeeds “stipulated that the 
arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration,” and 
AnimalFeeds argued, “that the term ‘silent’ did not simply mean that the clause 
made no express reference to class arbitration . . . . [But] the parties agree that 
 
 70. Id.  The Court explained that Stolt-Nielsen “assert[ed], without contradiction, that 
charterers like AnimalFeeds, or their agents—not the shipowners—typically select the particular 
charter party that governs their shipments.”  Id. 
 71. Id. at 667. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 74. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668; see In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 
296 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2003). 
 75. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668. 
 76. Id.  AnimalFeeds sought to represent a class of “[a]ll direct purchasers of parcel tanker 
transportation services globally for bulk liquid chemicals, edible oils, acids, and other specialty 
liquids from [petitioners] at any time during the period from August 1, 1988, to November 30, 
2002.”  Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 548 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2008), 
rev’d, 559 U.S. 662 (2010)) (alteration in original). 
 77. Id.  The agreement stipulated that the arbitration panel was to “follow and be bound by 
Rules 3 through 7 of the American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations.”  Id. 
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when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no agreement that has been 
reached on that issue.”78 
The arbitrators, relying on the Bazzle decision and the fact that “other 
arbitrators ruling after Bazzle had construed ‘a wide variety of clauses in a wide 
variety of settings as allowing for class arbitration,’” concluded that the 
arbitration clause in the case at hand allowed for class arbitration.79  
Furthermore, the arbitrators reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen did not “show an 
‘inten[t] to preclude class arbitration.’”80 
The parties sought judicial review, and Stolt-Nielsen filed an application to 
vacate the arbitrator’s award in the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.81  The District Court vacated the award, reasoning that “the 
arbitrators’ decision was made in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law insofar as the 
arbitrators failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.”82  The court held that the 
arbitrators would have “applied the rule of federal maritime law requiring that 
contracts be interpreted in light of custom and usage” if the arbitrators had 
conducted the analysis.83  AnimalFeeds appealed this to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which reversed on the grounds that Stolt-Nielsen had not cited 
any federal maritime rule of custom and usage against class arbitration.84 
Upon review, the Supreme Court majority held that even though there is a 
deferential standard applicable to judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions, the 
arbitration panel “exceeded [its] powers” by imposing its own policy choice on 
the issue of class arbitration availability.85  The majority also commented that 
the reliance on Bazzle was perhaps ineffective since “only the plurality” had 
decided that “an arbitrator, not a court, [should] decide whether a contract 
permits arbitration” but declined to revisit the question since Stolt-Nielsen and 
AnimalFeeds explicitly requested the arbitrator to determine whether class 
action was permitted.86  The Court concluded that because there was no 
agreement on the question of class arbitration, finding an implicit agreement 
where a provision was otherwise silent on the issue was not advisable due to the 
fundamental differences between individual and class arbitration.87 
 
 78. Id. at 668–69. 
 79. Id. at 669.  However, the panel noted that “none of these decisions was ‘exactly 
comparable’ to the present dispute.”  Id. 
 80. Id. (alteration in original). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 670. 
 84. Id. at 667, 670. 
 85. Id. at 671–72. 
 86. Id. at 680. 
 87. Id. at 685–87. 
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E.  Write What You Mean: Contract Silence and Ambiguity Toward Class 
Arbitration Precludes Its Availability in Lamps Plus 
Lamps Plus added to the growing line of class arbitration cases.88  This time, 
the issue focused on the FAA and its potential foreclosure of a state law 
arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on 
general language commonly used in arbitration agreements.89 
Lamps Plus is a seller of light fixtures and related products.90  In 2016, a 
hacker gained access to a Lamps Plus computer system and obtained “the tax 
information of approximately 1,300 other employees.”91  As a result, a 
fraudulent tax return was filed in a Lamps Plus employee’s name, Frank Varela, 
and Varela filed legal action against Lamps Plus.92 
Varela filed a class action complaint against Lamps Plus on March 29, 2016.93  
Lamps Plus responded by filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration on an individual 
basis because, as a condition of employment, Varela signed various documents, 
including an arbitration agreement.94  The arbitration agreement stated: 
The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration 
of all claims or controversies (“claims”), past, present or future that I 
may have against the Company or against its officers, directors, 
employees or agents in their capacity as such, or otherwise, or that the 
Company may have against me. Specifically, the Company and I 
mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims that may 
hereafter arise in connection with my employment, or any of the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under this Agreement.95 
Varela did not contest that he signed these documents, including the 
arbitration agreement.96  However, he contended that he “d[id] not remember 
signing this document or having its contents explained to him,” and that he “d[id] 
not remember being advised by anyone from Lamps Plus to consult an attorney 
prior to signing the arbitration provision.”97 
 
 88. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019). 
 89. Id. at 1415. 
 90. Id. at 1412. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1412–13. 
 93. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189521, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x. 418 (9th Cir. 2019) (Mem). 
 94. Id. at *2–3 (“The [Lamps Plus] Arbitration Agreement states that part of its ‘employment 
practice is agreeing to abide by the terms in the Arbitration Agreement,’” and [that] “an employee 
should therefore, ‘read this agreement and be willing to sign it if an employment offer is made.’”). 
 95. Id. at *3–4 (“The Agreement further state[d], in all capital letters: ‘I UNDERSTAND 
THAT I HAVE THREE (3) DAYS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT TO 
REVOKE THIS AGREEMENT AND THAT THIS AGREEMENT SHALL NOT BECOME 
EFFECTIVE OR ENFORCEABLE UNTIL THE REVOCATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED.’”). 
 96. Id. at *2–3. 
 97. Id. at *3. 
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The district court evaluated Varela’s arguments to invalidate the agreement 
due to unconscionability, which is outside the scope of this paper.98  However, 
it is worth noting the district court ruled that “[t]he Arbitration Agreement [wa]s 
not substantively unconscionable, and raise[d] only the most minimal concerns 
about procedural unconscionability . . . . [And] it w[ould] therefore not be 
invalidated on this basis.”99  As to the evaluation of the arbitration agreement, 
the court stated that “‘[i]t is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to 
determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate[.]’”100  The court cited to a 
Ninth Circuit opinion which stated that “[w]e interpret the contract by applying 
general state-law principles of contract interpretation, while giving due regard 
to the federal policy in favor of arbitration by resolving ambiguities as to the 
scope of arbitration in favor of arbitration.”101 
The District Court relied on Stolt-Nielsen’s holding and recognized that when 
a clause is “‘silent’ as to class arbitration, ‘the parties cannot be compelled to 
submit their dispute to class arbitration.’”102  However, the court distinguished 
Lamps Plus from Stolt-Nielsen because the parties in Stolt-Nielsen themselves 
expressly stipulated that there was “no agreement” as to class arbitration.103  The 
court further observed that that “[c]ourts have therefore limited Stolt-Nielsen to 
cases where an arbitration agreement is ‘silent in the sense that [the parties] had 
not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration, not simply . . . that 
the clause made no express reference to class arbitration.”104  The court agreed 
with Varela that the agreement’s language was ambiguous as to class claims, 
and the court employed the doctrine of contra proferentem to the agreement 
according to the court’s application of California precedent, which states that 
“the drafter of an adhesion contract must be held responsible for any ambiguity 
in the agreement.”105 
The Supreme Court held that ambiguous agreements cannot compel class 
arbitration under the FAA.106  The Court reinforced the principle in prior cases 
that “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [state law] rather than 
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA,”107 and that “courts may not rely on 
 
 98. See id. at *10–17. 
 99. Id. at *17. 
 100. Id. at *8 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am. 475 U.S. 643, 651 
(1986)) (alteration in original). 
 101. Id. at *8–9 (quoting Wagner v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 102. Id. at *18 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 
(2010)). 
 103. Id. at *18–19. 
 104. Id. at *18 (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2011)) 
(some alterations in original). 
 105. Id. at *19 (citing Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 106. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019). 
 107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011). 
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state contract principles to ‘reshape traditional individual arbitration by 
mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.’”108 
Furthermore, the Court scolded the lower court’s application of contra 
proferentem because it “require[ed] class arbitration on the basis of a doctrine 
that ‘does not help to determine the meaning that the two parties gave to the 
words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would have given to the 
language used.’”109  As a result, the state law was preempted because it stood 
“‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives’ of the FAA.”110 
Justice Thomas filed a concurrence in this case because he disagreed with the 
majority’s reasoning.  He wrote from a textualist perspective that “the arbitration 
agreement between Varela and Lamps Plus is silent as to class arbitration.  If 
anything, the agreement suggests that the parties contemplated only bilateral 
arbitration.”111  Accordingly, Justice Thomas would have reversed the lower 
courts on the basis that there was “no ‘contractual basis’ for concluding that the 
parties agreed to class arbitration.”112  He voiced his concern about the 
majority’s application of implied preemption precedent and its decision to 
reverse based on California’s contra proferentem rule but joined in the opinion 
“because it correctly applies [the] FAA precedents.”113 
IV.  THE COURT MUST DECIDE WHETHER THE USAGE OF CONTRA 
PROFERENTEM IS PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE AND IF THE FAA DISALLOWS 
ITS USE 
Jurisdictions are split over the question of whether clause construction is a 
matter of procedural or substantive arbitrability.114  “[T]he Second and Ninth 
Circuits have held that Bazzle remains good law; . . . [and] they . . . allocate 
clause construction to the arbitrator.”115  However, “the Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have predicted that the Court is just ‘a short step 
away from the conclusion that whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class 
arbitration . . . requires judicial review.’”116  While examining intent, these 
circuits “reason[ed] that judges, not arbitrators, should decide . . . whether a 
 
 108. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 
(2018)). 
 109. Id. (quoting 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559, 269–70 (1960)). 
 110. Id. at 1415 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352). 
 111. Id. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 112. Id. at 1419–20. 
 113. Id. at 1420. 
 114. David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse Into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-
Making, 68 DUKE L.J. 1323, 1355 (2019). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1356 (quoting Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 907 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 
2018)) (alteration in original). 
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silent arbitration clause allows class procedures.”117  Lamps Plus did not provide 
the answer to this question. 
Clause construction is difficult to classify as either a matter of substantive or 
procedural arbitrability.118  According to Corbin on Contracts, “[t]hrough 
‘interpretation’ of a contract, a court determines what meanings the parties, 
when contracting, gave to the language used.  Through ‘construction’ of a 
contract, a court determines the legal operation of the contract—its effect upon 
the rights and duties of the parties.”119 
The Court has used several approaches to distinguish the two.  By highlighting 
one of the FAA’s major goals to “move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out 
of court and into arbitration as quickly as possible,” this would lead to the 
presumption that the arbitrator should perform this task.  Arguably, having an 
arbitrator interpret an arbitration agreement allows disputes to take place in one 
forum.120  On the other hand, “the Court has [also] suggested that arbitrators 
should hear matters that they are better equipped than judges to decide.”121  In 
Bazzle, the Court relied on the expertise of the adjudicators.122  The Court 
observed that arbitrators are “experts in ‘contract interpretation and arbitration 
procedures.’”123  Since Bazzle, “several courts have deemed clause construction 
to be a matter of procedural arbitrability on the grounds that arbitrators excel at 
determining the parties’ intent.”124 
Party intent is another factor influencing whether a question is for the courts 
or the arbitrators.125  There is inconsistency among the courts when interpreting 
silent arbitration clauses.  While some “federal appellate courts have found that 
interpreting a silent arbitration clause is crucial because there is a ‘fundamental 
difference’ between two-party and class arbitration,”126 other courts view class 
actions as “a mere procedural device that leaves the ‘parties’ legal rights and 
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.’”127  Therefore, the class 
procedure does not allow the application of intent to clause construction, further 
muddling the answer to this question. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3 (2021) ( “Although these two words are most often 
used synonymously, a distinction between them does exist.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). 
 121. See Horton, supra note 114, at 1369.  See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444, 452–53 (2003) (explaining that “[a]rbitrators are well situated to” resolve questions of contract 
interpretation). 
 122. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454. 
 123. Horton, supra note 114, at 1369 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453). 
 124. Id. 
 125. E.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). 
 126. Horton, supra note 114, at 1370 (quoting Dell Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 
867, 876 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 127. Id. at 1370–71 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 
393, 408 (2010)). 
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A.  Contra Proferentem:Punishing the Drafter to Protect the “Underdog” 
In Lamps Plus and Stolt-Nielsen, the courts invoked the doctrine of contra 
proferentem to construe silence in a contract against the draftsman.128  However, 
contra proferentem’s “application does not assist in determining the meaning 
that the two parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a reasonable 
person would have assigned to the language used.”129  Commentators and judges 
have stated that contra proferentem is “a policy-driven attempt to ‘favor[] the 
underdog.’”130 
In Lamps Plus, the arbitration clause was ambiguous.131  The Court’s analysis 
considered the nature of arbitration and the purpose of the FAA, as well as the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of the state law contra proferentem doctrine to reach 
this conclusion.132  Notably, the Lamps Plus court rejected the lower court’s 
application of the contract doctrine.133  The open question for the Court, then, is 
how to reconcile the different state contract law views of contra proferentem 
throughout the country, as well as whether its usage when evaluating an 
arbitration clause that is silent or ambiguous on class proceedings.  Do these 
principles mean that contra proferentem should never be used because the FAA 
forbids it?  If these lines of cases hold that contra proferentem is an 
impermissible doctrine to use in cases invoking the FAA, the Court must clarify 
this. 
B.  The Federal Arbitration Act and Individualized Versus Class Arbitration 
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enforce arbitration agreements after 
observing “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”134  Since its 
enactment, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a policy favoring arbitration.135  
Court precedent states that the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration 
 
 128. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010).  In general, contra proferentem applies with 
special force to adhesion contracts.  See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem 
and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 440–46 (2009) (collecting pre-Stolt-
Nielsen cases invoking contra proferentem); see, e.g., Tahoe Nat’l Bank v. Phillips, 480 P.2d 320, 
327 (Cal. 1971) (“Since the alleged ambiguities appear in a standardized contract, drafted and 
selected by the bank, which occupies the superior bargaining position, those ambiguities must be 
interpreted against the bank.”). 
 129. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021). 
 130. Horton, supra note 114, at 1376 (quoting 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (1998)) 
(alteration in original). 
 131. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412. 
 132. Id. at 1417. 
 133. Id. at 1417. 
 134. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 135. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).  The Court states 
here “that the FAA’s pro[-]arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the 
contracting parties.”  Id.; see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (The 
FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”). 
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agreements according to their terms, but if the terms of an arbitration agreement 
are silent as to the availability of class arbitration, then courts may not compel 
parties to submit to class arbitration.136  The Court did not shut the door to class 
arbitration, but it maintained that parties should “not be compelled under the 
FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so.”137  The FAA envisioned “traditional 
individualized arbitration,”138 and defaulting to class arbitration when an 
agreement is ambiguous or silent would go against the FAA’s intent.139  The 
Court expanded on this characterization, stating that “class arbitration sacrifices 
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process 
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final 
judgment.”140 
C.  Lamps Plus and Contra Proferentem 
The doctrine of contra proferentem, or interpretation against that draftsman, 
is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 206 in the following 
manner: “[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates 
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds.”141  It is employed by courts as a last resort when searching for the 
parties’ intended meaning in situations where agreements are silent or 
ambiguous, and normally is applied after examining other factors such as 
“general, local, technical and trade usages and custom, and including the 
evidence of relevant circumstances which must be admitted and weighed.”142 
Contra proferentem is more often than not utilized as a device to equalize 
bargaining power between parties, particularly “to aid a party whose bargaining 
power was less than that of the draftsperson,”143 like Varela in Lamps Plus.144  
Varela and his co-workers signed an arbitration agreement in their employment 
contract as a condition of employment.145  Like many employment contracts, the 
Lamps Plus contract was an example of a standard-form agreement, or an 
adhesion contract, which is “prepared by one party, to be signed by another party 
in a weaker position . . . who adheres to the contract with little choice about the 
 
 136. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684. 
 137. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 138. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019). 
 139. Id. at 1417, 1419. 
 140. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).  The Supreme Court also 
asserted that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA.”  Id. 
at 349. 
 141. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 142. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412–13. 
 145. Id. at 1413. 
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terms.”146  Prior to Lamps Plus, the state and lower courts applied California law 
based on another arbitration case, Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., which 
concluded that ambiguity is construed against the drafter, a rule that “applies 
with peculiar force in the case of a contract of adhesion.”147  Before the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court in Lamps 
Plus “[b]ecause the Agreement [wa]s capable of two reasonable constructions, 
[and therefore] the district court correctly found ambiguity.”148  Thus, when 
applying California state law, the interpretation would be against Lamps Plus 
because it drafted the agreement.149 
The Court criticized the California usage of contra proferentem because 
“[u]nlike contract rules that help to interpret the meaning of a term, and thereby 
uncover the intent of the parties, contra proferentem is by definition triggered 
only after a court determines that it cannot discern the intent of the parties.”150  
The majority further described the doctrine as providing “a default rule based on 
public policy,” which would ultimately not reveal the parties’ intent and 
therefore cannot be used as proof of consent under the FAA.151 
Contract law, like property and tort law, is generally governed by state laws.  
Contra proferentem is a doctrine of contract law, and the states are free to apply 
it as they wish.  Contract law involves the study of interpretation and 
construction.152  “Interpretation” of a contract is when “a court determines what 
meanings the parties, when contracting, gave to the language used.”153  
“Construction” of a contract is when “a court determines the legal operation of 
the contract—its effect upon the rights and duties of the parties.”154  
Construction of a contract includes the interpretation of language, while 
interpretation does not determine party relationships.155  States are not on the 
same page when it comes to classifying to which category contra proferentem 
belongs, and this fact illustrates the variations of contract law in each state.156  
 
 146. Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 147. Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc. 623 P.2d 165, 172 n.16 (Cal. 1981) (en banc)).  The California Supreme Court held in 
this case that an employment-related arbitration provision that was silent as to whether the 
availability of class arbitration was to be resolved by a court or an arbitrator had to be interpreted 
against the employer as the drafter pursuant to California Civil Code, Section 1654, when an 
employee argued that the issue was for the arbitrator.  Id. 
 148. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 771 F. App’x 
418 (Mem) (2019). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (emphasis in original). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.23 (2021). 
 153. Id. at § 24.3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See e.g., Id. at § 24.27. 
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For example, in New Jersey, contra proferentem is a rule of contract 
interpretation, whereas in New York, it is a rule of contract construction.157 
D.  Preemption of Contra Proferentem 
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause is the foundation for federal preemption 
in which federal law supersedes conflicting state laws.158  One commentator 
remarked that “[w]hile the supremacy clause’s mandate rings clear, preemption 
issues are not always obvious or easily resolved.”159  There are several ways in 
which federal law may preempt state law.  Preemption is unequivocal “where 
federal law explicitly says that it preempts state law.”160  It is inferred when “one 
can imply a clear congressional intent to preempt state or local law.”161 
There are two types of implied preemption: “field preemption” and “conflict 
preemption.”162  Field preemption occurs when “the federal regulatory scheme 
is so pervasive that it supports the reasonable inference that Congress intended 
that the states could not supplement it.”163  Conflict preemption, also known as 
obstacle preemption, occurs when “a regulated entity cannot physically comply 
with both federal and state regulations or ‘where state law stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of 
Congress.’”164  In Lamps Plus, the Court rejected the usage of contra 
proferentem because it was an obstacle to Congress’s purpose and objectives of 
the FAA.165 
Generally, “courts start with a presumption against preemption—in 
recognition of the limited power of the federal government and the primary 
authority of the states.”166  “In its obstacle preemption cases, the Court has held 
that state law can interfere with federal goals by frustrating Congress’s goal . . . 
of establishing a regulatory ‘ceiling’ for certain products or activities, or by 
 
 157. See Caitlin Specialty Ins. Co. v. QA3 Fin. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(quoting 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (1998)) (finding under New York state common law 
that contra proferentem “‘is not actually [a rule] of interpretation’ as ‘its application does not assist 
in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a 
reasonable person would have assigned to the language used’”).  Cf. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 
73 (N.J. 2007) (illustrating that, in New Jersey, the “rule of [ambiguous] contract interpretation 
requires a court to adopt the meaning that is most favorable to the non-drafting party”). 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 159. LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 702 (2nd 
ed. 2018). 
 160. Id. at 703. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)). 
 165. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417–18 (2019). 
 166. Little, supra note 159, at 703 (emphasis in original). 
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impeding the vindication of a federal right.”167  The Court has also warned that 
“obstacle preemption does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry’ into 
whether state laws are ‘in tension’ with federal objectives, as such a standard 
would undermine the principle that ‘it is Congress rather than the courts that 
preempts state law.’”168 
In Lamps Plus, Justice Thomas concurred in the opinion’s application of FAA 
precedents but voiced skepticism of obstacle preemption, stating, “I remain 
skeptical of this Court’s implied pre-emption precedents.”169  Notably, Justice 
Thomas has “criticiz[ed] the Court for ‘routinely invalidat[ing] state laws based 
on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, 
or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within 
the text of federal law.’”170  Regardless of how the Court is currently composed, 
as it stands in Lamps Plus, the FAA preempts the use of contra proferentem in 
a silent or ambiguous arbitration clause through obstacle preemption.171 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note hopes to demonstrate that the Supreme Court should clarify its 
stance on class arbitrability and preemptive effects of the FAA on state law when 
applied to determine if class arbitrability is available.  If it does not take a clear 
stance, the Court will continue to grant certiorari to cases asking similar 
questions and will issue similarly vague guidance that the lower courts will 
struggle to apply. 
The author hopes that the Court’s future decisions do not mar the freedom of 
contract on this subject and that it will strive to maintain the integrity of a 
contract’s contents as much as possible.  For the Court to interfere with the 
intentions of contracting parties is to interfere with the longstanding American 
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